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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
The Petitioner Maxfield has filed for a Writ of 
Certiorari from the Decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining 
the judgment of the trial court. The decision of the Court of 
Appeals was rendered August 23, 1989. The sole issue presented 
to the Supreme Court is whether the Petitioner's brief raises the 
appropriate considerations governing review of certiorari by the 
Utah State Supreme Court. The governing law in determining this 
question are the provisions of Rule 4 3 of the Rules of the Utah 
Supreme Court. Rule 4 3 provides: 
(1) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has 
rendered a decision in conflict with a decision of 
another panel of the Court of Appeals on the same 
issue of law; 
(2) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has 
decided a question of state or federal law in a 
way that is in conflict with a decision of this 
court; 
(3) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has 
rendered a decision that has so far departed from 
the accepted and usual course of judicial proceed-
ings or has so far sanctioned such a departure by 
a lower court as to call for an exercise of this 
court's power of supervision; or 
(4) When the Court of Appeals has decided an 
important question of municipal, state or federal 
law which has not been, but should be, settled by 
this court. 
Statement of Facts 
This action arises out of a dispute between Reed 
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Maxfield and Owen A. Rushton and Carol Rushton, his wife, with 
respect to the title and right of possession of two parcels of 
real estate located in Salt Lake County, Utah. 
Maxfield filed his original Complaint on October 20, 
1980, simply alleging that he was the fee title owner of the prop-
erty and entitled to possession. Rushtons filed a Third-party 
Complaint joining the State of Utah as a third-party defendant to 
the action. 
On or about December 10, 1984, Maxfield filed a motion 
to file a second amended complaint including causes of action for 
fraud and punitive damages despite the fact that the trial date 
had been set for January 10, 1985, only one month from the date of 
filing of said motion. Shortly thereafter, in December 1984, 
Maxfield filed a petition in bankruptcy under a Chapter 11 
proceeding. Subsequently, the judge in the Bankruptcy Court per-
mitted the lawsuit to be heard in the Third Judicial District 
Court. 
On June 1, 1987, the trial judge, after hearing oral 
argument from the parties, set a scheduling order which included 
the first place trial setting of September 15, 1987. On August 
10, 1987, counsel for Maxfield filed a motion to continue the 
trial date. The motion was denied on August 17, 1987. On August 
11, 1987, Maxfield filed a motion to dismiss all claims by any of 
the parties against the plaintiff. 
On August 19, 1987, the plaintiff Maxfield then filed a 
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third amended complaint raising entirely new issues including a 
civil rights cause of action. At the pretrial hearing on August 
31, 1987, with all parties present, counsel for Maxfield moved 
that he be allowed to withdraw. At that time, the court heard 
arguments from all the parties including the plaintiff Maxfield 
himself. The court, after hearing all the arguments from the 
parties, dismissed the plaintiff's cause of action for failure to 
prosecute. 
The Court of Appeals, in reviewing the file, was very 
much aware of the fact that the defendants had filed three 
requests for trial settings and had obtained four trial settings 
and that plaintiff Maxfield continually opposed all of the 
defendants' or court's efforts to have the matter proceed in a 
judicious manner for trial. The plaintiff appealed from the judg-
ment dismissing his cause of action and raised the following 
issues in his brief: 
1. The District Court erred in refusing to 
grant plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
(Page 10 of Appellant's Brief.) 
2. As a matter of law, the execution and sale 
of real property of record in plaintiff by State 
of Utah for satisfaction of third-party judgment 
was improper and plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment should have been granted. (Page 13 of 
Appellant's Brief.) 
3. The court erred in failing to grant an 
order allowing redemption of the real property. 
(Page 14 of Appellant's Brief.) 
4. The court erred in entering an order of 
dismissal of the plaintiff's Complaint for failure 
to prosecute. (Page 16 of Appellant's Brief.) 
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In the Petition filed by the Appellant for a Writ of 
Certiorari, the following specific questions are presented for 
review: 
1. The District Court dismissed the plaintiff1s 
case when the plaintiff was ready, willing and able to 
proceed. 
2. The trial court erred in denying the plaintiff's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals written by 
Judge Garff confirmed the action of the trial court. In 
particular, Judge Garff stated on page 3: 
The trial court dismissed Maxfield's cause of 
action pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, for his "failure to timely prose-
cute the case." 
Such a dismissal under Rule 41(b) operates as an adjudi-
cation upon the merits of the case. The court on page 4 of its 
opinion states: 
After a thorough review of the record, we find 
that Maxfield was dilatory in prosecuting the 
case. After he filed his complaint on October 20, 
1980, he amended it twice and attempted to amend 
it yet a third time, each time adding additional 
theories of the case. He moved three times for 
summary judgment: the first time on March 11, 
1981, prior to joinder of the State; the second 
time on May 30, 1984; and the third time on June 
19, 1984, when he neglected to give adequate 
notice of the hearing to opposing counsel. He 
filed an interlocutory appeal in 1981, appealing 
the trial court's refusal to grant his first 
motion for summary judgment, which the supreme 
court declined to hear . . . Further, on three 
occasions trial dates were set, he objected to the 
trial settings on the grounds that he wished to 
amend his complaint, that he was involved in the 
bankruptcy proceeding, and that his new counsel 
had inadequate preparation time. During the 
course of the action, he retained three different 
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attorneys, two of whom withdrew from the case 
because of his failure to pay them. He filed no 
certificates of readiness for trial and, despite 
his protests as to insufficient discovery time, no 
motions for the taking of depositions. 
Judge Orme, in a concurring opinion, states on page 8: 
Sua sponte dismissal for failure to prosecute 
is usually not appropriate except when it follows 
a substantial period of complete inactivity. It 
would be an extraordinary case where such a dis-
missal would be appropriate with trial scheduled 
in just a few days, especially following a flurry 
of motion activity. While the question is a 
closer one for me than the main opinion may 
suggest, I am persuaded this is that extraordinary 
case. 
It is evident that the Court of Appeals was familiar 
with all the issues that were raised on appeal and are now raised 
by this Writ of Certiorari—and specifically addressed them. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE PETITIONER, BY WRIT OF CERTIORARI, HAS 
REPEATED THE SAME ISSUES RAISED ON APPEAL AND 
HAS NOT RAISED ANY ISSUES AS DEFINED BY RULE 43 
OF THE RULES OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT. 
Unless otherwise provided for in tl^ e constitution or 
statutory form, certiorari is not a writ of right in most cases. 
Its issuance rests upon the sound discretion of the court to which 
the petition is made. Boggess v. Morris, 635 P.2d 39 (Utah 1981). 
The Petition will not be granted and the Writ will not be issued 
on the mere suggestion of the party that there is an error in the 
record. The pleading seeking relief by way of certiorari must 
specifically designate the jurisdictional excesses or abuse of 
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discretion claimed and are subject to being dismissed if they 
merely set forth a conclusion. Lee v. Provo City Civil Service 
Commission, 582 P.2d 485 (Utah 1978). The Utah Court in Rohwer 
v. District Court, 125 P. 671 (Utah 1912) has indicated that a 
special case must be shown for the court to exercise its discre-
tion in issuing a common law writ of certiorari. Therefore, the 
writ of certiorari is to be used sparingly. 
Rule 4 3 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court is very 
specific in setting forth the considerations which shall govern 
the court's review of certiorari. The Court of Appeals must have 
rendered a decision which is in direct conflict with the decision 
of another panel of the Court of Appeals. The panel of the Court 
of Appeals must have decided a question of state or federal law in 
such a manner that it is in conflict with the Utah Supreme Court. 
Third, a panel of the Court of Appeals rendered a decision which 
radically departs from the usual course of judicial proceeding. 
Fourth, the Court of Appeals decided an important question of 
municipal, state or federal law which has not been but should be 
settled by the Utah State Supreme Court. 
In reviewing these considerations, it is obvious that 
the only possible consideration that could be raised as an appro-
priate consideration is number 3 which should require that the 
Court of Appeals issue a decision which is extreme and did consti-
tute an abuse of discretion in arriving at its decision. 
Clearly, the decision of the Court of Appeals demon-
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strated that the Court of Appeals fully understood all of the 
facts in the case and thereafter applied the appropriate law as 
set forth in the decision of this court. In particular, the 
appropriate law was applied from the rulings in Brasher Motor and 
Finance Company v. Brown, 23 Utah 2d 247, 461 P.2d 464 (Utah 
(1969); Westinghouse Electric Supply Company v. Paul W. Larsen 
Contractor Inc., 544 P.2d 876 (Utah 1975); K.L.C. Incorporated 
v. McLean, 656 P.2d 986 (Utah 1982). In Maxfield v. Fishier, 538 
P.2d 1323 (Utah 1975), the Utah Supreme Court found that the trial 
court justifiably dismissed the plaintiff's case because she had 
been dilatory in responding to the defendant's efforts of 
discovery, had resisted attempts made by the defendant to get the 
case to trial, was not ready to proceed at the time of the trial 
date because of inexcusable neglect, and had no justification for 
continuance as required by Utah Rules of Civijl Procedure 41(b). 
Not only did the Court of Appeals understand clearly the 
history of this case, it applied the law in a fair and even-handed 
manner. There certainly was no abuse of any discretion. 
Petitioner, by filing for writ of certiorari, not only 
fails to raise any issue as required under the four considerations 
as set forth in Rule 43, said petitioner simply repeats the same 
issues raised on appeal. With respect to the first question 
raised for review, counsel for the petitioner in his brief 
states: 
The District Court dismissed the plaintiffs 
case when plaintiff was ready willing and able to 
proceed. The dismissal coming in a pre-trial con-
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ference a mere 15 days prior to trial date. 
Evidently the District court became irritated and 
frustrated with counsel for Plaintiff who indi-
cated he wanted to withdraw at that point. 
This argument is an unsupported emotional request for 
undeserved assistance from the Supreme Court. It also represents 
a serious misrepresentation of the actual facts as they are 
related in the decision of the Court of Appeals. 
With respect to the second issue raised in the Petition 
for Writ for Certiorari, the Petitioner states: 
Early in the chronological history of this 
case the plaintiff moved the district court for 
summary judgment based on pleadings and 
affidavits . . . The Honorable Judge Sawaya denied 
the motion for summary judgment and an 
interlocuatory appeal was filed with the Supreme 
Court . . . Plaintiff believes that the ruling 
denying the Motion for Summary Judgment by Judge 
Sawaya was in error and should have been granted. 
* * * 
. . . The Utah Court of Appeals either did not 
consider the argument or if so, overlooked 
entirely the point in its opinion. 
The foregoing statement is in direct conflict with the 
opinion of the Court of Appeals which on numerous occasions refers 
to Appellant's motions for summary judgment and the reasons for 
the denial thereof. Again, it is amply clear that the court was 
not only familiar with the requests and motions for summary judg-
ment but declared that the failure to prosecute is a more overrid-
ing issue and that the case was justifiably dismissed. 
The Petition has not raised any appropriate considera-
_ Q _ 
tion upon which the Supreme Court of Utah can grant the Writ of 
Certiorari. 
II 
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION WHEN RENDERING ITS DECISION. 
The primary issue presented to the dourt of Appeals on 
appeal was whether or not the trial court erred in dismissing the 
plaintifffs Complaint under Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. With respect to the standard to be followed by the 
courts in determining whether or not a complaint should be dis-
missed under Rule 41(b), the case of K.L.C Incorporated v. Ron 
McLean, 656 P.2d 986 (Utah 1982) reiterates the five basic factors 
to be considered by the court in similar casek: 
1. The conduct of both parties; 
2. The opportunity each had to move the case forward; 
3. What each of the parties has dofte to move the case 
forward; 
4. What difficulty or prejudice ma^ have been caused 
to the other side; 
5. And most important, whether injustice may result 
from the dismissal. 
The Court of Appeals1 opinion addresses this very 
standard. Judge Garff on page 4 of the Decision states: 
A court's discretion, however, must be balanced 
against higher priority; to "afford disputants an opp-
ortunity to be heard and to do justice between them." 
Westinghouse Electric Supply Company, 544 P.2d at 879. 
Thus, there is more to consider in determining if a dis-
missal for failure to prosecute is proper than merely 
the amount of time elapsed since the suit was filed. 
Id. The factors which we consider may include the 
following: (1) The conduct of both parties; (2) the 
opportunity each party has had to move the case forward; 
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(3) what each of the parties has done to move the case 
forward; (4) what difficulty or prejudice may have been 
caused to the other side; and (5) most important, 
whether injustice may result from the dismissal. 
After a thorough review of the record, we find that 
Maxfield was dilatory in prosecuting the case. 
The decision of the Court of Appeals was one based on 
sound reasoning, fairness, justice, and after due consideration. 
CONCLUSION 
The Respondents Rushton respectfully submit that the 
Petition has not presented any issue that can or should legally 
support the granting of a Writ of Certiorari. The Petition 
itself is an emotional repetition of the same arguments that have 
been made for more than nine years. As Judge Orme stated in his 
concurring opinion: 
The system had been burdened long enough. 
Dismissal for failure to timely prosecute was an appro-
priate exercise of judicial discretion. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this jf day of October, 1989. 
NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT 
BV f^fA}^ 
Hertry'S. Mgaard 
Attorney ror Respondents, 
Owen and Carol Rushton 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OOOOO 
Reed Maxfield, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Owen A. Rushton and Carol 
Rushton, his wife, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Owen A. Rushton and Carol 
Rushton, his wife, 
Third-Party Plaintiffs and 
Respondents, 
v. 
State of Utah, by and through 
Utah State Department of 
Social Services, 
Third-Party Defendants and 
Co-Respondents. 
F I L E D 
"•yc 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 880332-CA 
Ct#rk of t>* Court 
Ute* Court • ! Appttlt 
Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake City 
The Honorable David S. Young 
Attorneys: Lorin N. Pace, Salt Lake City, for Appellants. 
Henry S. Nygaard, Salt Lake City, for Respondents; 
David L. Wilkinson, Stephen G. Schwendiman, Bernard 
M. Tanner, Leonard E. McGee, Salt Lake City, for 
Third-Party Defendants. 
Before Judges Garff, Greenwood, and Orme. 
GARFF, Judge: 
Plaintiff and appellant, Reed Maxfield, appeals the trial 
court's dismissal of his action against defendants and 
respondents, Owen A/ and Carol Rushton, and the State of Utah, 
for failure to prosecute. We affirm the trial court's 
dismissal of his action. 
We recite only those facts pertinent to disposition of this 
appeal. 
APPENDIX A, PAGE 2. 
Mazfield initially filed his complaint in this action on 
October 20, 1980, alleging that the Rushtons had wrongfully 
deprived him of his property by purchasing it through an 
illegal sheriff's sale. The Rushtons filed their answer and 
counterclaim on April 1, 1981, along with a third-party 
complaint against the State of Utah, requesting reimbursement 
of the purchase price for the property if the court should find 
in Mazfield's favor. On April 14, 1981, the State answered the 
Rushtons' third-party complaint and filed a third-party 
complaint against Mazfield. 
From October 20, 1980 until December 14, 1984, various 
motions were filed by the parties, primarily by Mazfield, 
resulting in obfuscation of the issues and protracted delay. 
Two additional factors contributed to the delay: an eighteen 
month interruption while the Rushtons were on a mission for 
their church, and a bankruptcy filing by Mazfield. 
The case remained in limbo for nearly two years as a result 
of Mazfield's bankruptcy. Finally, on November 18, 1986, the 
Rushtons filed a certificate of readiness for trial. Ten days 
later, Mazfield objected to setting the case for trial because 
he wished to amend his complaint by adding further claims 
against the State, his discovery was incomplete, his bankruptcy 
stay was presently effective, and his new attorney needed time 
to familiarize himself with the case. Despite Mazfield's 
objections, on February 20, 1987, the bankruptcy court ordered 
that the case could be heard in district court. Thereupon, the 
State filed for an immediate trial setting. 
On March 4, 1987, Mazfield's counsel withdrew because 
Mazfield had failed to pay him. On March 20, 1987, the 
Rushtons gave Mazfield notice to obtain substitute counsel and, 
again, moved for an immediate trial setting. A hearing was 
scheduled on this motion for June 1, 1987. On May 18, 1987, 
Mazfield filed a pro s& objection to the trial setting on the 
grounds that he was incapable of handling the case himself and 
that he was in the process of seeking new counsel. 
At the June 1 hearing, the court set trial for September 
15, 1987, and scheduled a pretrial hearing on August 31, 1987. 
All discovery was to be completed prior to August 17, 1987. 
On August 10, 1987, the State certified to the court that 
it had complied with Mazfield's discovery requests, answered 
Mazfield's proposed second amended complaint, and moved for 
APPENDIX A, PAGE 3 . 
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summary judgment against Maxfield. Maxfield filed a motion to 
dismiss all claims by other parties against him because of his 
discharge in bankruptcy and filed an objection to the trial 
setting, requesting a two month continuance on the grounds that 
his new counsel had scheduling problems and that he intended to 
file a third amended complaint. The court scheduled a hearing 
on the State's motion for summary judgment for August 24, 1987. 
Between August 11 and 17, 1987, the parties filed more 
miscellaneous motions. On August 17, 1987, the court denied 
Maxfield•s motion to continue the trial date or to extend 
discovery time. Thereafter, Maxfield filed a response to the 
State's motion for summary judgment, alleging insufficient 
discovery time, and filed his third amended complaint, which 
set forth a new conspiracy theory between the Rushtons and the 
State. 
On August 20, 1987, the State submitted a list of expected 
witnesses and a certificate of compliance with Maxfield9s 
discovery requests. The following day, it objected to 
Maxfieldvs third amended complaint. The Rushtons filed a 
similar objection. The trial court heard all the parties' 
motions on August 24, 1987, denying Maxfield's motion to file a 
third amended complaint and also the State's motion for summary 
judgment. 
At the pretrial hearing on August 31, 1987, the trial court 
again denied the parties* prior motions. Maxfield's new 
attorney moved to withdraw as counsel. The court denied 
counsel's motion to withdraw, and ordered that Maxfield's 
action be dismissed for failure to timely prosecute. Maxfield 
subsequently appealed this order. 
On appeal, Maxfield argues that the trial court erred in: 
(1) dismissing his action for failure to prosecute; (2) 
refusing to grant summary judgment in his favor; and (3) 
refusing either to void the sheriff's sale, thereby quieting 
title in his favor, or to grant him the immediate right to 
redeem the properties. 
The trial court dismissed Maxfield's cause of action, 
pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
for his "failure to timely prosecute the case."1 Such a 
1. Utah R. Civ. P. 41(b), in part, states that "[flor failure 
of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these rules or 
any order of court, a defendant may move for dismissal of an 
action or of any claim against him." 
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dismissal, under Rule 41(b), "operates as an adjudication upon 
the merits" of the case. 
It is well established that the trial court may, on its own 
motion, dismiss an action for want of prosecution under Rule 
41(b). Brasher Motor & Fin. Co. v. Brown. 23 Utah 2d 247, 461 
P.2d 464, 464-65 (1969); Charlie Brown Constr. Co. v. Leisure 
Sports Inc.. 740 P.2d 1368, 1370 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). This 
authority is an "inherent power,' governed not by rule or 
statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to 
manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and 
expeditious disposition of cases." Charlie Brown Constr. Co.. 
740 P.2d at 1370 (quoting Link Y. Wabash R, CO., 370 U.S. 626, 
630-31 (1962)). Therefore, the trial court has "a reasonable 
latitude of discretion in dismissing for failure to prosecute 
if a party fails to move forward according to the rules and the 
directions of the court, without justifiable excuse." 
Westinohouse Elec. SUPPIV CO. V. Paul W. Larsen Contractor 
Inc.. 544 P.2d 876, 878-79 (Utah 1975) (footnote omitted). 
Consequently, a lower court's dismissal of a case under Rule 
41(b) will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is clear from 
the record that it has abused its discretion. Wilson v. 
LambALfc, 613 P.2d 765, 767 (Utah 1980); Department of Social 
Servs. v. Romero, 609 P.2d 1323, 1324 (Utah 1980); Reliance 
Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Caine. 555 P.2d 276, 277 (Utah 1976); 
Thompson Ditch Co. v. Jackson. 29 Utah 2d 259, 508 P.2d 528, 
529 (1973). 
A court's discretion, however, must be balanced against a 
higher priority: to "afford disputants an opportunity to be 
heard and to do justice between them." Westinohouse Elec. 
Supply Co.. 544 P.2d at 879. Thus, there is more to consider 
in determining if a dismissal for failure to prosecute is 
proper than merely the amount of time elapsed since the suit 
was filed. Ifl. The factors which we consider may include the 
following: (1) The conduct of both parties; (2) the 
opportunity each party has had to move the case forward; (3) 
what each of the parties has done to move the case forward; (4) 
what difficulty or prejudice may have been caused to the other 
side; and (5) most important, whether injustice may result from 
the dismissal. K.L.C. Inc. v. McLean. 656 P.2d 986, 988 (Utah 
1982); Utah Oil Co. v. Harris. 565 P.2d 1135, 1137 (Utah 
1977). 
After a thorough review of the record, we find that 
Maxfield was dilatory in prosecuting the case. After he filed 
his complaint on October 20, 1980, he amended it twice and 
880332-CA 
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attempted to amend it yet a third time, each time adding 
additional theories of the case. He moved three times for 
summary judgment: the first time on March 11, 1981, prior to 
joinder of the State; the second time on May 30, 1984; and the 
third time on June 19, 1984, when he neglected to give adequate 
notice of the hearing to opposing counsel. He filed an 
interlocutory appeal in 1981, appealing the trial court's 
refusal to grant his first motion for summary judgment, which 
the supreme court declined to hear. He then filed a number of 
miscellaneous, primarily self-serving motions over the course 
of the proceedings, none of which served to move the case 
forward, but were, instead, apparent attempts to circumvent the 
denial of his motions for summary judgment. He further delayed 
prosecution of the case for nearly two years by filing for 
bankruptcy on December 10, 1984, shortly before the case was to 
come to trial. During this bankruptcy action, he assigned his 
interest in the disputed property, which was his major asset, 
to a corporation which he allegedly owned and controlled as the 
primary shareholder. Further, on the three occasions trial 
dates were set, he objected to the trial settings on the 
grounds that he wished to amend his complaint, that he was 
involved in the bankruptcy proceeding, and that his new counsel 
had inadequate preparation time. During the course of the 
action, he retained three different attorneys, two of whom 
withdrew from the case because of his failure to pay them. He 
filed no certificates of readiness for trial and, despite his 
protests as to insufficient discovery time, no motions for the 
taking of depositions. 
Although the Rushtons did not answer Maxfieldfs complaint 
for approximately six and one-half months after it was 
initially filed, the rest of their conduct and that of the 
State generally served to move the case along. Together, the 
Rushtons and the State filed four motions indicating their 
readiness for trial, one of which was filed almost immediately 
after the Rushtons returned from their mission. The record 
indicates that they actively pursued discovery, including the 
taking of depositions, and certified twice that they had 
complied with Maxfield9s discovery requests. In contrast, they 
had to file motions twice to compel Maxfield to comply with 
their discovery requests. 
In evaluating the relevant factors, we find, first, that 
Maxfield9s conduct in prosecuting the case was dilatory while 
defendants9 overall conduct served to move the case along. 
APPENDIX A, PAGE G. 
Second, although both parties were unable at tiroes to move 
the case forward, Mazfield's behavior was more dilatory. 
Mazfield was unable to prosecute the case while the Rushtons 
served their eighteen month mission. However, once the 
Rushtons returned, they almost immediately notified the court 
that they were ready to proceed to trial. Similarly, 
defendants were unable to prosecute the case during the 
pendency of Mazfield's twenty-two month bankruptcy action. 
Unlike the Rushtons, however, Mazfield did not voluntarily 
inform the court that his bankruptcy action was completed and 
the case could move forward in district court, but, instead, 
objected to trial settings and waited for the State to petition 
the bankruptcy court for permission to proceed with the action. 
Third, despite his prodigious number of motions, little or 
nothing that Mazfield did after filing his initial complaint 
served to move the case along, while virtually everything that 
defendants did after the Rushtons returned home from their 
mission did. 
Fourth, defendants argue that, if we overrule the trial 
court and remand this case for hearing on the merits, they will 
be substantially prejudiced because many of their witnesses 
have either forgotten the events surrounding the controversy or 
have become unavailable in the nine years this case has been 
pending. To rebut Mazfield's assertion that he will be 
prejudiced by loss of his property interest without having had 
his day in court, defendants point out that Mazfield's property 
interest is already assigned to a corporation in which he 
claims to have no interest. We do not find these assertions to 
be unreasonable. 
Fifth, while we recognize that injustice could result from 
dismissal of this case, in that Mazfield will lose whatever 
interest he may have in the disputed property without having 
the opportunity to argue his case on its merits, we conclude 
that he had more than ample opportunity to prove his asserted 
interest and simply failed to do so. Such nonaction is 
inezcusable, not only from the standpoint of the parties, but 
also because it constitutes abuse of the judicial process. 
In Mazfield v. Fishier. 538 P.2d 1323, 1324-25 (Utah 1975), 
the Utah Supreme Court found that the trial court justifiably 
dismissed the plaintiff's case because she had been dilatory in 
responding to the defendant's efforts at discovery, had 
resisted attempts made by the defendant to get the case to 
trial, was not ready to proceed at the time of the trial date 
« 
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because of inexcusable neglect, and had no justification for 
continuance as required by Utah R. Civ. P. 40(b).2 We find 
that the present case is factually comparable to Maxfield v. 
Fishier and other cases which have been dismissed for failure 
to prosecute. Sfifi e.g., Thompson Ditch Co.. 508 P.2d at 528. 
We, therefore, affirm the trial court's judgment in dismissing 
Maxfield's action. 
this issue isAispositive of the case, we decline 
axfield"s retraining issues. Costs on appeal to 
Jtegnal W. Garff, Judg, 
I CONCUR 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
2. Utah R. Civ. P. 40(b) provides that, 
[u]pon motion of a party, the court may in 
its discretion, and upon such terms as may 
be just, including the payment of costs 
occasioned by such postponement, postpone 
a trial or proceeding upon good cause 
shown. If the motion is made upon the 
ground of the absence of evidence, such 
motion shall also set forth the 
materiality of the evidence expected to be 
obtained and shall show that due diligence 
has been used to procure it. The court 
may also require the party seeking the 
continuance to state, upon affidavit or 
under oath the evidence he expects to 
obtain, and if the adverse party thereupon 
admits that such evidence would be given, 
and that it may be considered as actually 
given on the trial, or offered and 
excluded as improper, the trial shall not 
be postponed upon that ground. 
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ORME, Judge (concurring specially): 
Sua sponte dismissal for failure to prosecute is usually 
not appropriate except when it follows a substantial period of 
complete inactivity. It would be an extraordinary case where 
such a dismissal would be appropriate with trial scheduled in 
just a few days, especially following a flurry of motion 
activity. While the question is a closer one for me than the 
main opinion may suggest, I am persuaded this is that 
extraordinary case. 
In my view, what saves the dismissal in this case from 
crossing into the realm of abused discretion is this: 
Maxfield's latest counsel's motion for leave to withdraw 
coupled with his motion for leave to file yet another amended 
complaint constituted, taken together, a concession by Maxfield 
that he was nowhere near being ready to try his case in a 
matter of a few days even though the action had been pending 
for the better part of a decade. It is the length of time this 
action had been pending coupled with Maxfield's obvious 
unreadiness that make sua sponte dismissal appropriate in this 
case. I reiterate, however, that in the ordinary case where a 
trial date is set, potentially dispositive motions have been 
denied at a recent pretrial, and all parties are represented by 
counsel, however reluctant such representation might be, the 
appropriate course for the court is simply to try the case, 
even though earlier periods of inaction may exist. 
I also wish to comment on two aspects of the main 
opinion's analysis of the parties' comparative culpability in 
connection with the delays which plagued this case. First, the 
opinion says that "Maxfield was unable to prosecute the case 
while the Rushtons served their eighteen month mission" and 
seems to imply that the Rushtons were likewise relieved of 
their duty to move the case along during that period. However, 
voluntary absence from the jurisdiction does not insulate a 
party from litigation nor is it a legitimate justification for 
avoiding one's own litigation obligations. This is so even 
where the reasons for the absence are well-intentioned, such as 
with the Rushtons' religious mission in this case. 
Second, the main opinion seems to blame Maxfield for a 
delay of nearly two years following his bankruptcy filing and 
to suggest that Rushtons were excused from pursuing their 
counterclaims during that time. But from all that appears, 
Maxfield's bankruptcy petition was legitimate under federal law 
and I do not see how we can fault him for taking advantage of 
his rights under this federal scheme. That being the case, 11 
U.S.C. § 362 stayed the Rushtons and the state from pursuing 
their claims against him. Of course, this "automatic stay" 
protects the debtor from the prosecution of actions against 
him, but does not, of itself, excuse him from proceeding with 
his. actions pending against others. Nonetheless, the debtor's 
claims pending against others become the property of the 
bankruptcy estate and where the bankruptcy is one where a 
trustee is appointed, the trustee succeeds the debtor as real 
party in interest relative to those claims. The trustee enjoys 
the authority to administer the claims, i.e., pursue them, 
settle them, or abandon them as the trustee may deem 
appropriate. Thus, Maxfield may not be responsible for the 
inactivity in the instant action which followed his bankruptcy 
filing. Even if he is, the delay may be entirely legitimate 
depending on the objectives and status of the bankruptcy cases 
and the ongoing progress of liquidation or reorganization. 
Conversely, one who has an action pending against a party 
who files a bankruptcy petition—as with the Rushtons and their 
counterclaim against Maxfield—is not altogether helpless in 
the face of the bankruptcy filing. With leave of the 
bankruptcy court, as ultimately was obtained here, the claim 
can be pursued in state court at least to the point of 
liquidating the claim or, with consent of the non-bankruptcy 
party, can be adjudicated by the bankruptcy court. Depending 
on the particular case, waiting two years to request relief 
from the stay may or may not be consistent with appropriate 
diligence on the part of Rushton and the state. 
In short, lengthy delays in state court litigation, for 
which "bankruptcy* is offered up as the major excuse, should be 
carefully scrutinized. Bankruptcy is simply not the hinderance 
to the timely resolution of disputes pending in state court 
which many would have state court judges believe. 
The parties to the main action in this case sparred and 
postured for some seven years, showing little inclination to 
get their claims resolved on the merits. The system had been 
burdened long enough. Dismissal for failure to timely 
prosecute was an appropriate exercise of judicial discretion. 
Gregory l^brme, Judge 
Rule 41 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
discretion of trial court. Sharp v. Canakis 
Gianulakis, 63 Utah 249, 225 P. 337 (1924). 
Trial courts have substantial discretion in 
deciding whether to grant continuances. 
Christenson v. Jewkes, 761 P.2d 1375 (Utah 
1988). 
—Inability of counsel to attend trial. 
The inability of counsel to be present at the 
time set for trial does not necessarily entitle 
his client to a continuance. Griffiths v. Ham-
mon, 560 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1977). 
Unavoidable absence. 
When counsel has made timely objections, 
given necessary notice, and has made a reason-
able effort to have the trial date changed for 
good cause, it would be an abuse of discretion 
not to grant a continuance. Griffiths v. Ham-
mon, 560 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1977). 
—New theory of case. 
Continuance could be obtained to develop a 
theory of the case suggested after issue joined 
and before trial. Tiernan v. Trewick, 2 Utah 
393 (1877). 
—Procedural delays. 
Court properly denied motion for contin-
uance in action based on credit card obligation 
which had been procedurally delayed for two 
and a half years by interrogatories and by vari-
ous motions of the defendant; and although 
trial date had been set for four months, motion 
for continuance was not filed until nine days 
before trial. First Sec. Bank v. Johnson, 540 
P.2d 521 (Utah 1975). 
—Supporting affidavits. 
Subdivision (b) does not require affidavits to 
accompany a motion for continuance. Bairas v. 
Johnson, 13 Utah 2d 269, 373 P.2d 375 (1962). 
—Unavailable witness. 
' Lack of diligence. 
Where subpoena for absent witness was not 
placed in hands of an officer for service until 
the morning the case was called for trial, 
though it had been set for several weeks, and 
the witness had testified at a former trial, con-
tinuance was denied. Corporation of Members 
of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints 
v. Watson, 30 Utah 126, 83 P. 731 (1906). 
In malpractice action, motion for contin-
uance based on plaintiffs inability to serve 
subpoena on vacationing medical witness was 
properly denied, where plaintiff had made no 
effort to depose witness and had never con-
tacted witness for the purpose of testifying. 
Maxfield v. Fishier, 538 P.2d 1323 (Utah 
1975). 
Need. 
Where the defendant's counsel had three 
Weeks to prepare for trial, and where two of the 
witnesses, purportedly important to his case, 
were actually present at trial and thus subject 
to cross-examination, the purely speculative 
heed for a third witness did not entitle the de-
fendant to the granting of a motion for contin-
uance. State v. Humpherys, 707 P.2d 109 
(Utah 1985). 
Cited in Thorley v. Thorley, 579 P.2d 927 
(Utah 1^78). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 17 Am. Jur. 2d Continuance ness in civil case, 15 A.L.R.3d 1272. 
1 to 26,43 to 53; 75 Am. Jur. 2d Trial §§ 25, 
26. 
C.J.S. — 17 C.J.S. Continuances § 1 et seq.; 
88 CJ.S. Trial §§ 18 to 35. 
A.L.R. — Admissions to prevent contin-
uance sought to secure testimony of absent wit-
Continuance of civil case as conditioned 
Upon applicant's payment of costs or expenses 
incurred by other party, 9 A.L.R.4th 1144. 
Key Numbers. — Continuance «=» 1 et seq.; 
Trial •» 1 to 7. 
Rule 41. Dismissal of actions. 
(a) Voluntary dismissal; effect thereof. 
(1) By plaintiff; by stipulation. Subject to the provisions of Rule 
23(c), of Rule 66, and of any applicable statute, an action may be dis-
missed by the plaintiff without order of court (i) by filing a notice of 
dismissal at any time before service by the adverse party of an answer or 
of a motion for summary judgment, or (ii) by filing a stipulation of dismis-
sal signed by all parties who have appeared in the action. Unless other-
wise stated in the notice of dismissal or stipulation, the dismissal is with-
out prejudice, except that a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication 
upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in any 
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court of the United States or of any state an action based on or including 
the same claim. 
(2) By order of court- Except as provided in Paragraph (1) of this 
subdivision of this rule, an action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiffs 
instance save upon order of the court and upon such terms and conditions 
as the court deems proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defen-
dant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiffs motion to dismiss, the 
action shall not be dismissed against the defendant's objection unless the 
counterclaim can remain pending for independent abdica t ion by the 
court. Unless otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal under this 
paragraph is without prejudice. 
(b) Involuntary dismissal; effect thereof. For failure of the plaintiff to 
prosecute or to comply with these rules or any order of court, a defendant may 
move for dismissal of an action or of any claim against him. After the plaintiff, 
in an action tried by the court without a jury, has completed the presentation 
of his evidence the defendant, without waiving his right to offer evidence in 
the event the motion is not granted, may move for a dismissal on the ground 
that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. The 
court as trier of the facts may then determine them and render judgment 
against the plaintiff or may decline to render any judgment until the close of 
all the evidence. If the court renders judgment on the merits against the 
plaintiff, the court shall make findings as provided in Rule 52(a). Unless the 
court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this 
subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a 
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for improper venue or for lack of an indis-
pensable party, operates as an adjudication upon the merits. 
(c) Dismissal of counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim. The 
provisions of this rule apply to the dismissal of any counterclaim, cross-claim, 
or third-party claim. A voluntary dismissal by the claimant alone pursuant to 
Paragraph (1) of Subdivision (a) of this rule shall be made before a responsive 
pleading is served or, if there is none, before the introduction of evidence at 
the triad or hearing. 
(d) Costs of previously-dismissed action. If a plaintiff who has once 
dismissed an action in any court commences an action based upon or including 
the same claim against the same defendant, the court may make such order 
for the payment of costs of the action previously dismissed as it may deem 
proper and may stay the proceedings in the action until the plaintiff has 
complied with the order. 
(e) Bond or undertaking to be delivered to adverse party. Should a 
party dismiss his complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, 
pursuant to Subdivision (a)(l)(i) above, after a provisional remedy has been 
allowed such party, the bond or undertaking filed in support of such provi-
sional remedy must thereupon be delivered by the court to the adverse party 
against whom such provisional remedy was obtained. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is substan-
tially similar to Rule 41, F.R.C.P. 
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Rule 42 RULES OF THE UTAii SUPREME COURT 
TITLE VI. JURISDICTION ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO COURT OF APPEALS. 
Rule 42. Review of judgments, orders, and decrees of 
Court of Appeals. 
Unless otherwise provided by law, the review of a judgment, an order, and a 
decree (herein referred to as "decisions") of the Court of Appeals shall be 
initiated by a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Utah 
(Added, effective April 20, 1987.) 
Rule 43. Considerations governing review of certiorari. 
Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial discre-
tion, and will be granted only when there are special and important reasons 
therefor. The following, while neither controlling nor wholly measuring the 
court's discretion, indicate the character of reasons that will be considered: 
(1) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision in 
conflict with a decision of another panel of the Court of Appeals on the 
same issue of law; 
(2) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided a question of 
state or federal law in a way that is in conflict with a decision of this 
court; 
(3) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision that 
has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceed-
ings or has so far sanctioned such a departure by a lower court as to call 
for an exercise of this court's power of supervision; or 
(4) When the Court of Appeals has decided an important question of 
municipal, state, or federal law which has not been, but should be, settled 
by this court. 
(Added, effective April 20, 1987.) 
Rule 44. Certification and transmission of record; filing; 
parties. 
(a) Appearance, docketing fee, filing, and service. Counsel for the peti-
tioner shall, within the time provided by Rule 45, pay the certiorari docketing 
fee and file, with proof of service as provided by Rule 21, ten copies of a 
petition which shall comply in all respects with Rule 46. The case then will be 
placed on the certiorari docket of the court. Counsel for the petitioner shall 
serve four copies of the petition on counsel for each party separately repre-
sented. It shall be the duty of counsel for the petitioner to notify all parties in 
the case of the date of filing and of the certiorari docket number of the case. 
Service and notice shall be given as required by Rule 21. 
(b) Joint and separate petitions. Parties interested jointly, severally, or 
otherwise in a decision may join in a petition for a writ of certiorari; any one 
or more of them may petition separately; or any two or more of them may join 
in a petition. When two or more cases are sought to be reviewed on certiorari 
and involve identical or closely related questions, it will suffice to file a single 
petition for a writ of certiorari covering all the cases. 
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HENRY S. NYGAARD, ESQ. (Bar No. 2435) 
BEASLIN, NYGAARD, COKE 6 VINCENT 
Attorneys for Owen A. Rushton and Carol Rushton 
333 North 300 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Telephone: (801) 328-2506 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
REED MAXFIELD AND UTAH'S 
GREAT GAME PRESERVE, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
OWEN A. RUSHTON, CAROL RUSHTON, 
et al, 
Defendants. 
J U D G M E N T 
OWEN A. RUSHTON and CAROL 
RUSHTON, 
Third Party 
P l a i n t i f f s , 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through 
Utah State Department of Social 
Services, 
Third Party Defendant 
and Third Party 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
REED MAXFIELD, 
Third Party Defendant. 
C i v i l No. C80-8167 
Judge: David Young 
_ i _ awPNnTY P Tsan-p i 
This matter came on for pre-trial conference on Monday, 
August 31, 1987, at 2:00 o'clock p.m. by order of the court. 
Personal appearances were entered by the plaintiff, Reed Maxfield; 
plaintiff's counsel, Charles C. Brown and Jeffrey B. Brown; 
defendants Rushtons9 counsel, Henry S. Nygaard; and counsel for 
State of Utah, namely: Steven Schwendiman, Bernard Tanner and 
Leonard McGee. The plaintiff, Reed Maxfield, and his legal 
counsel argued that the issues of the Second Amended Complaint 
included those set forth in plaintiffs proposed Third Amended 
Complaint, a 1983 civil rights cause of action, and that Steven 
Schwendiman be designated as a John Doe defendant. Plaintiff's 
counsel moved that they be allowed to withdraw upon the grounds 
that plaintiff has not consummated a fee agreement with counsel; 
counsel for the defendants Rushton and the State of Utah argued 
that all relevant Issues were set forth in plaintiff1s Second 
Amended Complaint and the defendants1 responsive pleadings includ-
ing their Answers, Crossclaims, and Counterclaims. 
The court, after reviewing the pleadings and exhibits on 
file, having heard arguments from the plaintiff personally, and 
counsel for all the parties, and being fully advised in the 
premises, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. Plaintiff1s causes of action be dismissed for fail-
ure to timely prosecute. 
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2. Rights of redemption shall commence to run upon exe-
cution of this Judgment. 
3. Defendants are awarded costs. 
DATED this 3^ day of <feo£+ZJU% 1 9 8 7 . 
BY THE COURT: 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
BROWN, SMITH 6 HANNA 
(f J9^ dfird hf*++l 
Judge Btevid Young ? tr 
By: 
Charles C. Brown 
Counsel for Plaintiff 
STATE OF UTAH 
Bel 
Assistant Attornfe$~General 
Counsel for State of Utah 
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Office of ATTORNEY GENERAL HENRY S. NYGAARD, ESQ. (Bar No. 2435) 
BEASLIN, NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT 
Attorneys for Owen A. Rushton and Carol Rushton 
333 North 300 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Telephone: (801) 328-2506 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
REED MAXFIELD AND UTAH'S 
GREAT GAME PRESERVE, 
Plaintiffs, 
VS. 
OWEN A. RUSHTON, CAROL RUSHTON, 
et al, 
Defendants. 
NOTICE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT 
OWEN A. RUSHTON and CAROL 
RUSHTON, 
Third Party 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through 
Utah State Department of Social 
Services, 
Third Party Defendant 
and Third Party 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
REED MAXFIELD, 
Third Party Defendant. 
Civil NO. C80-8167 
Judge: David Young 
-l-
TO ALL PARTIES: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that Judgment Was entered in 
favor the defendants on the 30th day of September, 1987, by the 
Honorable David Young. A copy of the Judgment is attached. 
DATED this ^ day of October, 1987. 
BEASLIN, NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT 
By:
 efeS Henry S.yNygaard 
Attorney for Defendants Owen A. 
Rushton and Carol Rushton 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
) SS: 
County of Salt Lake ) 
MARGARET A. NELSON, being duly sworn, says: 
That she is employed in the offices of Beaslin, Nygaard, 
Coke & Vincent, attorneys for defendants Owen A. and Carol 
Rushton herein; that she served the attached NOTICE OF ENTRY OF 
JUDGMENT upon: 
Bernard Tanner, Esq. 
Asst. Attorney General 
130 State Capitol Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, UT 64114 
Mr. Reed Maxfield 
410 East 7620 South 
Midvale, UT 84047 
Charles C. Brown, Esq. 
Jeffrey B. Brown, Esq. 
Brown, Smith & Hanna 
City Centre I, Suite 401 
175 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope and 
depositing the same, sealed, with first-class postage prepaid 
thereon, in the United States mail at Salt Lake City, Utah, on 
^
n e
 '•3-' ^ a v °f October, 1987. 
^ • *u*0^7ltL 'xZfK^ 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of 
October, 1987. 
Notary Public 
Residing at Salt Lake City, UT 
My Commission Expires: 
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